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INTRODUCTION 
Lawmakers in the world's two largest economies, the United States 
and Japan, have enacted legislation to require firms to at least consider 
altering their governance structure. In the United States, the 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rules have led to revised governance structures at the 30 Dow 
Jones (DJ) companies. The governance changes affect the composition, 
size and functions of the board of directors and its relations with the 
chief executive officer (CEO). Research findings reveal some distinct 
governance elements that other firms may want to consider using. A 
2003 change in the Japanese Commercial Code provided firms with 
three governance options, including a "Company with Committees" 
system similar to that found in U.S. firms. To date, only a small 
percentage of Japanese firms are selecting that system. While the 
hesitancy to change is grounded in cultural components of the existing 
corporate governance structure, there is clear evidence that the strength 
of those factors is diminishing. 
In the DJ 30 firms, the size of boards has decreased and 
independence of board members appears to be increasing. We note, 
however, that having a majority of directors who are from outside the 
firm, as is true of all firms surveyed, does not always result in an 
independent board. Outside directors may lack independence, and it is 
independence among directors that is vital to effective corporate 
governance. Usually the CEO is the only insider on the board and the 
CEO is usually, but not always, the chairman of the board. The 
relationships between boards and external auditors vary little due to the 
SOX requirements. 
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In Japan, there has been a reduction in the size of boards and a 
small increase in the number of outside board members. As in the 
United States, the CEO is often dominant in selecting board members. 
Japanese firms now have three governance options available and each, 
particularly the new "Company with Committees" system, is examined 
here along with the reasons why firms either change or decide not to do 
so. We endorse allowing firms to adopt different governance systems to 
accommodate special needs as well as country, corporate and cultural 
concerns. Each country's system has improved the outlook for more 
effective corporate governance. The U.S. legal changes are already quite 
extensive, but specific additions to the Japanese Code are needed to 
obtain clearer oversight by corporate boards. Greater use of independent 
directors and the separation of the CEO and Chairman roles by firms in 
both countries would enhance corporate governance. 
A. Impetus for Governance Reform in the U.S. and Japan 
In the United States, corporate governance reform emerged after 
widespread financial scandals came to light. According to reports 
compiled by Bloomberg.com and yahoofinance.com, as of August 2002 
the scandals at Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, Xerox, World 
Com, Arthur Andersen, ImClone and a few other firms led to billions of 
dollars in lost stock value and at least one hundred thousand lost jobs.1 
More than a dozen corporate financial reports were found to contain 
misstatements and omissions that likely were deliberate attempts to 
provide misleading or false information. A few corporate executives 
engaged in criminal behavior; additionally, the CEO and the board of 
directors at most of those firms generally claimed to be unaware of what 
was happening under their supervision. The lack of supervision by the 
board also emerged as an issue when examining CEO compensation. 
Were the directors who established the CEO' s salary, bonuses, stock 
options and executive perks too easily influenced by the CEO? 
Shareholders, particularly the large institutions, were angry at corporate 
boards and officers. In the U.S., pension fund managers and other 
institutional investors, not silent individual investors, now control more 
than 50% of U.S. corporate equity.2 Although criminal and civil cases 
1. See 'Perp Walks' and Watchdogs Can Thwart Corporate Crime, USA TODAY, July 
9, 2004, at lOA. This editorial notes that indictments and criminal charges have been 
brought against executives at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco and Health South. Since 
January 2002, the federal Enron Task Force has charged 29 former Enron executives and 
outside advisers with crimes associated with Enron's accounting fraud. Id. 
2. New York Stock Exchange, Institutional Investors: Ownership of U.S. Equities, at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/06_INSTITUTIONALINVESTORS.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 
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are still pending against many executives involved in the scandals, the 
U.S. Congress quickly reacted to the outrage by passing the most 
significant corporate accountability change in several decades-the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 3 
In Japan, the primary reason for governance reform was the 
realization that Japanese corporations must reform business operations 
and organizational structures to remain competitive with U.S., European 
and Chinese firms. A second agent for reform was the dramatic change 
in the composition of shareholders. Banks and other stable customer or 
supplier firms that owned and were owned by keiretsu partner firms 
once were dominant shareholders; however, in recent years institutional 
funds and individual investors have grown in influence.4 With cross-
shareholding clearly diminishing, many Japanese firms no longer could 
count on shareholders whose concerns were focused more on long-term 
business relationships than on the return on their investments. 5 Instead, 
they now must react to concerns about corporate profitability and a 
firm's return on investment from institutional investors in Japan and 
abroad. Finally, as in the United States, Japan has had a number of 
corporate scandals that have diminished investor trust in Japanese 
corporations. In Japan, when corporate scandals involve illegal or 
unethical behavior, usually some officers resign in disgrace, but little 
change in corporate accountability occurs. Scandals have affected such 
well-known enterprises as Yukijirushi Nippon Meat Packer and Tokyo 
Electric in the past few years.6 At Yukijirushi, because the management 
did not know how to react to a major food poisoning scandal, the firm 
2005). Based on data from the Federal Reserve Board's flow of funds, as of the third quarter 
of 2000, institutional investors held $9.7 trillion or 50.8% of U.S. equities. Id. 
3. See 'Perp Walks' and Watchdogs Can Thwart Corporate Crime, supra note 1. As of 
July 10, 2004 five Enron executives, including Chairman Kenneth Lay and CEO Jeff 
Skilling are currently awaiting trial. John Rigas, the former CEO of Adelphia has been 
convicted, but former CEOs Bernard Ebbers of World Com, Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco and 
Richard Scrushy of Health South each awaits trial on fraud-related charges. See id. A 
detailed report on who has been charged, who is being questioned and why is available from 
CBS Market Watch at http://cbs.marketwatch.com/news/features/scandal_sheet.asp (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2005); see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2002). 
4. See Hidetaka Kawakita, The Attitude of Investors Since 1990s, 32 NISSAY REs. INST. 
47 (April 2004). The report notes that the Japanese capital market is now changing to the 
place where individual investors as well as institutional investors have grown in influence. 
Id. 
5. See Fumiaki Kuroki, The Relationship of Companies and Banks as Cross-
Shareholdings Unwind-Fiscal 2002 Cross-Shareholding Survey, NISSA Y RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE (2003), available at http://www.nli-
research.co.jp/eng/resea/econo/eco031118.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
6. See Hideaki Kubori, Shacho no Ketsudan ga Kaisha wo Mamoru [The Decision of a 
CEO Protects a Corporation], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUNSHA 35, 63, 179 (2003). 
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went bankrupt. Executives were forced to resign due to the mislabeling 
of beef at Nippon Meat Packers and because false inspection data was 
used to conceal problems at nuclear power plants operated by Tokyo 
Electric. Even Mitsubishi Motors was caught in covering up decades of 
customer complaints about defective vehicles. 
I. LEGAL REFORMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, after the eruption of numerous corporate 
scandals and an outcry to do something to ensure such scandals would 
not continue, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 30, 
2002 and created a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
to oversee the audits of public companies. Some major provisions of the 
Act deal with whom in the firm is responsible for internal controls and 
financial reporting, the authority and expertise of the audit committee 
and the role of the audit committee vis-a-vis external auditors. Its 
provisions affect officers and directors of public companies and 
mandates changes in the relationship between the firms and their 
outside auditors.7 The Act affects U.S. public companies, foreign firms 
(including, of course, some Japanese firms) subject to the U.S. 
securities laws, public accounting firms and regulatory bodies like the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ.8 Since the Act's 
passage, both the SEC and the major stock exchanges have imposed 
new requirements on public firms. 9 
The SEC has adopted a dozen major rulemaking initiatives in 
response to the Act's requirements. 10 The rules deal with insider trading 
reports, the independence of outside auditors, the need for board 
approval of auditor services, new and accelerated disclosure 
requirements and reports on internal controls over financial reporting. 11 
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, P.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 787 (codified as amended 
in 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7209 (2005)) [hereinafter SOX]. 
8. "Issuer" means any firm that issues registered securities, following the definition 
found in section 3 of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78c). SOX, 15 
U.S.C.S. § 7201(7) (2005). Foreign public accounting firms are expressly subject to the 
rules of the Accounting Oversight Board. Id. at § 7216; For a comprehensive list of post 
SOX SEC rules related to corporate governance, see 
http://www.protivi.com/knowledge/sec.rptrs/index.html. 
9. Stephen Labaton, Will Reforms With Few Teeth Be Able to Bite?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
22, 2002. 
10. See Bryan Cave LLP, Corporate Finance Bulletin, Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC 
Corporate Governance Rules and Proposals Summary (June 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.byancave.com/files/tbl_s7Publications%5CDetails33%5C849%5CSSarbanes-
SECRulesSummary6-13-03.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
11. Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003) 
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Both the NYSE and NASDAQ also address the independence of board 
members, as well as other issues noted infra. Taken together, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC rules and the NYSE and NASDAQ rules 
address three main areas of corporate governance: corporate 
accountability and disclosure, the independence of the board of 
directors and the role of auditors. 12 As the independence of the directors 
affects both the role and compensation for the CEO, the CEO's role vis-
a-vis the board also has become a governance concern. 
A. Corporate Accountability and Disclosure 
According to agency theory, the board of directors of a corporation 
is accountable to the shareholders who elect them and corporate officers 
are accountable to the board of directors who place them in charge of 
day-to-day operations. In the United States, the board's primary role is 
seen as providing oversight or monitoring to ensure the actions of its 
managers are effective, legal and even ethical. Although board members 
are there to monitor the actions of the managers, some board members 
in firms involved in the financial scandals said they did not know about 
their firm's significant financial activities. Enron's Board was criticized 
for failing to ask pertinent questions or to seek explanations regarding 
the nature of the partnership transactions that moved debt off the firm's 
balance sheet. 13 
In addition to being accountable to their owners, modem 
stakeholder theory usually holds the corporation's board of directors 
accountable to its stakeholders-employees, suppliers, customers and 
community officials. 14 According to Professor Cindy Schipani of the 
University of Michigan Business School: 
(providing the SEC's approval of NYSE and NASDAQ rule changes); Notice of Filing of 
Proposed Rule on Auditing Standard No. 2, 69 Fed. Reg. 20,672 (Apr. 16, 2004) (providing 
notice of auditing standards rules proposed by the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board); and 17 C.F.R. 228.10-.703, (adding disclosure requirements for the nominating 
committee and communications between security holders and board members per NASDAQ 
and NYSE rules approved by the SEC). 
12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7231-34 (2005) (auditor independence requirements); see 15 
U.S.C.S. §§7241-46 (2005) (corporate accountability requirements); see also 68 Fed. Reg. 
64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003) (detailing requirement of independence for some company board 
members, pursuant to NASDAQ and NYSE rules approved by the SEC). 
13. See Reed Abelson, Enron 's Many Strands: The Directors; Enron 's Board Quickly 
Ratified Far-Reaching Management Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at C6. 
14. See R.E. Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modem Corporation, in ETHICAL 
THEORY & BUSINESS 56 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., Prentice Hall 6th 
ed. 2001). 
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the accountability of corporate boards in corporate 
governance has evolved over the years, and, courts and 
legislatures often are caught in balancing acts. Historically, 
the challenge was to strike a balance between holding 
directors accountable to shareholders and not overly 
constraining their ability to perform their job. But these are 
not the only balances that need to be considered. Most states 
permit that in making certain corporate decisions, officers 
and directors can consider the welfare of other corporate 
constituencies in addition to shareholders. Once the facts of 
the Enron and other situations fully come to light, questions 
will arise not only about accounting practices and regulations 
but also about the role of the board of directors and its 
oversight function. Only time will tell how these issues will 
be resolved, but it wouldn't be surprising to find the courts 
and legislatures strengthening the board's oversight function 
in an effort to promote more corporate accountability. 15 
Corporate laws in the United States, which require directors to act 
in an informed manner, do give directors and officers the flexibility to 
balance shareholders' interest against other stakeholders.16 
The corporate scandals also brought to the forefront another 
problem, ensuring the accuracy of information. Although it may seem 
reasonable to assume that the CEO is the one person who in the end is 
accountable for all corporate information, the legal responsibility for 
certain information needs to be clear. Former Enron CEO Jeffrey 
Skilling said he was unaware of the company's questionable partnership 
practices that were used to conceal debt from Enron shareholders, "this 
was a very large corporation. It would be impossible to know 
everything going on."17 
Because of such statements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires both 
the CEO and the CFO to sign and file, with the company's lOK and 10-
Q forms, their certifications regarding the effectiveness of the 
15. See Cindy Schipani, Crisis in Corporate America, available at 
http://www.bus.umich.edu/FacultyResearch/Research/Crisis.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
16. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing 
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REv. 579, 634 (1992); Steven M. H. Wallman, 
Understanding the Purpose of the Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L 807, 809-10, 
812 (1999). 
17. See Stephen Labaton & Richard A Oppel, Jr., Enron 's Many Strands: The 
Overview; Testimony of Enron Executives is Contradictory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at 
Al,C8. 
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company's internal controls over financial reporting as well as the 
adequacy and accuracy of disclosures contained in the reports. 18 The 
Annual Report must contain an "internal control report," which shall 
state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining 
an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial 
reporting. At the end of the issuer's fiscal year, a report must assess the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the 
issuer for financial reporting. 19 
B. Independence, Size and Knowledge of the Board of Directors 
Boards of directors are crucial to a strong corporate structure. 
While managers are selected to operate the firm, the directors "are 
representatives of the shareholders, whose purpose under the law is to 
safeguard the assets of the corporation."20 The distinction between the 
board as a monitor of managers and also as being responsible for the use 
of firm assets is not always clear, particularly where the board member 
is also an executive of the firm. The independence of board members is 
critical because the board occupies an important role: "it must balance 
two distinct powers-the power of those who own the corporation and 
the power of those who run it. A corporation depends on shareholders 
for capital, but reserves the day to day running of enterprise for 
management. "21 
Board members are supposed to exercise their independent 
judgment in making corporate decisions. However, while directors are 
elected by corporate shareholders, in practice their selection usually can 
be traced directly to the CEO. This may be particularly true because 
U.S. board members, who usually are all from outside the firm, may be 
unable to devote sufficient time or have the requisite knowledge of the 
firm's problems. Consequently, they are unable or unwilling to impose 
restraint in setting either CEO or board members compensation and 
benefit packages or to challenge operational plans favored by the 
executives. In the United States, the push for greater outside 
representation on boards started in the 1970s because outside directors 
were thought to bring greater independence to their oversight role. 
However, Cynthia Glassman, a SEC Commissioner, noted in a recent 
18. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title IV, §404, 116 Stat. 789 (codified as amended in 
15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2004)). 
19. SOX, Enhanced Financial Disclosures, 15 U.S.C.S. §7262 (2005). 
20. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA.L. REv. 247, 299-315 (1999). 
21 . See ROBERT MONKS & NEIL MINNOW' CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE 164 (2d ed. 2001 ). 
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speech that "[a]s we examined various scandals that had occurred, 
director independence increasingly was seen as a missing element 
necessary to position the [b ]oard to oversee management, foster 
integrity and prevent such misbehavior from occurring. "22 Thus, while 
U.S. directors, unlike their Japanese counterparts, usually are from 
outside the corporation, their friendship with and dependence upon the 
CEO means they lack needed independence. 
Although both the NYSE and NASDAQ now require a majority of 
a publicly traded corporation's board to be independent, they differ 
slightly as to how to best determine such independence. The NYSE 
specifies that a director who has a "material relationship" with the listed 
company cannot be considered independent. The NASDAQ directive 
defines an "independent director" as one who is not an employee of the 
company and who does not have a relationship which, in the opinion of 
the company's board, would interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director. 23 Companies 
listed on the exchanges must, with some exceptions, have compensation 
and nominating committees composed solely of independent directors.24 
The SEC rules support requiring the nominating committee members to 
be independent of management. 25 Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
NASDAQ and NYSE will be required to de-list companies that do not 
comply with the new rules on independence. 
To be effective, boards must have some meetings at which only 
independent members are present. To help insure independence and 
lessen the possibility of conflicting interests affecting the judgment of 
board members, directors' fees must be the sole compensation for 
independent directors, although these fees can vary due to different 
director responsibilities. The payments can be in cash, stock and/ or 
22. Cynthia A Glaasman, Board Independence and the Evolving Role of Directors, 
Securities & Exchange Comm'n, at http://www.sec.gov.speechspch022004cag.htm (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2005) (quoting Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Board, A Means to What 
End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534, 538-48 (1984)). 
23. NASDAQ's Rule 4200 (a)(14), (15) prohibits a former employee of a public 
company or any of its subsidiaries if employed during the preceding three years or whose 
relative accepted $60,000 or more during said period from the company to be considered 
independent. Id. 
24. See SEC Notice 68 Fed. Reg. 64154 (Nov. 4, 2003) (noting NYSE and NASDAQ 
Rules that allow for a non-independent director to be a member of the nominating 
committee if the board, under exceptional and limited exceptions, determines that to be in 
the best interest of the company and its shareholders). 
25. Id. The SEC statement reads "The Commission believes that directors that are 
independent of management are more likely to support the nomination of qualified 
independent directors and that a written document governing the nominating committee is 
beneficial." Id. 
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options. Public companies are prohibited from making, or arranging for, 
personal loans for any director or executive officer.26 
In addition to the selection process and independence of directors, 
the size of the board may have an influence on a board's effectiveness. 
A board that is too big may be unworkable. 
In 1993, Rawleigh Warner, a director of American Express at the 
time, noted, "the size of a [b ]oard does make a difference. The 
American Express Board had 19 members and four advisors to the 
Board. That large a board, I believe, makes for an unwieldy number 
and prevents an opportunity for each member to speak freely."27 
Warner's comments seem to have been listened to. According to 
Spencer Stuart's survey of large U.S. companies, the average board size 
was 15 in 1988 and 12 in 1998.0ur survey shows the average size of 
boards at the 30 DJ firms in 2004 was 12.5.28 
A final issue related to corporate directors concerns their 
knowledge, particularly of financial and accounting issues. Members of 
the Enron board of directors have been criticized for their lack of 
attention to the off-book financial entities with which Enron did 
business. Special requirements for the audit committee of the board are 
discussed below. Similarly, there is a need for the board of directors to 
make sure they have access to all needed information. The directors 
should have ultimate approval over information flow to the board, 
meeting agendas, and meeting schedules to ensure that they have 
sufficient time for discussion of all agenda items.29 
C. The Role of Auditors and the Audit Committee 
The Enron scandal, which caused the downfall of Arthur Andersen, 
also raised questions about the duties and responsibilities of a firm's 
auditors. When lead partners and local offices derive significant parts of 
their income from a key client, objectivity may disappear. Auditors who 
have long-standing relations with their clients may lack the critical eye 
that is necessary to the performance of their tasks. As for internal 
auditors, they need to make sure that they, as well as the directors on the 
board's audit committees, have access to necessary information. Robert 
26. SOX, P.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 787, § 402(a) (codified as amended in 15 
U.S.C.S. § 78m(k)(l) (2002). 
27. MONKS AND MINNOW, supra note 21, at 166. 
28. See Table 1 infra at 208. 
29. See Gary Gray, Corporate Governance, available at 
http://www.gcwf.com/ gcc/GrayGaryC/Practice-A/Corp/cgbdirpt.doc_cvt.htm (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2005). 
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Jaedicke, a former Stanford Business School Dean, stated to lawmakers 
that he and other members of Enron' s audit committee were misled 
through years of inaccurate earning reports. He said: 
The lifeblood of the work of any [a]udit [c]ommittee is 
the development and implementation of adequate controls, 
many of which cross check each other. And the oversight 
function of the [ c ]ommittee depends on the full and complete 
reporting of information to it. Without full and accurate 
information, an [a]udit [c]ommittee cannot be effective.30 
He blamed Enron' s management and outside consultants for providing 
incorrect information. 
Both Sarbanes-Oxley and the NYSE requirements include 
provisions to increase the authority and responsibilities of the board's 
audit committee and to ensure that it has the necessary independence 
and expertise.31 The audit committee must have the sole authority to 
hire and fire a company's independent auditor and to pre-approve any 
significant non-audit relationship with the independent auditor. The 
audit committee also must have the ability to engage independent 
counsel and other expert advisors.32 SOX requires that each member of 
a publicly traded board's audit committee must be "independent." 
Under this requirement, a director is not independent if the director has 
received any consulting or other fees outside his or her capacity as 
director or committee member, or if the director is affiliated with the 
company or its subsidiary. This standard excludes from audit committee 
membership representatives of large stockholders, and it is stricter than 
the NYSE and NASDAQ rules, which include some exceptions.33 
At least one director must qualify as a financial expert who, among 
other things, understands generally accepted accounting principles and 
has experience in preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial 
30. Financial Collapse of Enron Corp.: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (2002) (prepared 
testimony of Robert Jaedicke, Chairman of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors 
of Enron Corp.), available at 
http:energycommerce.house.gov/107 /hearings/02072002hearing485/Jaedicke798.htm (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
31. See Jane Padget, Major Changes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Jan. 2, 2003) 
available at http://www.kc.frb.org/bs&s/ confer/2003regupdate/Sarbanes_ Oxley .doc. (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2005). 
32. SOX, §301(5), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2004). 
33. See Gray, supra note 29. 
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statements that present a breadth and level of complexity of accounting 
issues reasonably expected to be raised.34 Professor Hideki Kanda of 
Tokyo University, suggests that both independence and "financial 
literacy" should be required for all members of a board's audit 
committee.35 New NYSE and NASDAQ requirements specify that all 
members of an audit committee must be financially literate, with at least 
one member having extensive accounting or financial management 
expertise. 36 Additionally, SEC rules require firms to disclose whether 
they have an "audit committee financial expert" on the committee and if 
not, why not. 
Since external auditors are hired to check on the corporation's 
financial records, it is unlikely that corporate executives who are 
responsible for maintaining those records will want aggressive 
independent auditors if the executives themselves have reason to believe 
the records can be questioned. Responsibility for hiring external 
auditors should rest with independent board members, not with 
corporate executives in charge of financial records. As auditor 
independence is a crucial issue for corporate governance, SOX imposes 
several requirements related to partner rotation, auditor's reporting, 
cooling off period, and prohibited activities. Auditors are also 
prohibited from providing other work such as appraisal or valuation 
services, actuarial services, investment banking services and legal 
services unrelated to the audit.37 
II. LEGAL REFORMS IN JAPAN 
Japan's revised Commercial Code, effective April 1, 2003, sought 
"to create a corporate governance system so as to revitalize Japanese 
corporations and to establish a corporate decision-making system with 
greater agility and mobility."38 Some proponents of change wanted to 
require all major firms to adopt a new governance system, but when 
business opposition arose, the compromise of offering options, 
34. SOX, P.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 787, § 407. 
35. See Hideki Kanda, Beikoku ni Okeru Corporate Governance no Saishin Jokyo 
[Current Situation of Corporate Governance in the U.S.] KANSAYAKU No. 437, 20 (2001). 
36. KANSAS CITY FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, Major Changes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Jan. 2, 2003 available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/bx&s/confer/2003Reg Update/Sarbanes_ Oxley .doc (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
37. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title IV,§ 201(a), 116 Stat. 789. 
38. Shigeru Morimoto et al., Discussion Concerning Options for Corporate 
Governance System and the Future Development, TORISHIMARIY AKU No HOMU [LAW 
JOURNAL FOR DIRECTORS], July 25, 2002, at 11. 
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including the option of not making any change, was adopted. 39 "The 
option to use a 'Company with Committees' system was intended to 
make clear the distinction between the oversight and operational 
function in a corporation." 40 
Several major cultural elements found in most Japanese firms stand 
out as affecting corporate governance. They include the development of 
harmony and the use of a different decision-making process among life-
long corporate employees; the central role of a main bank; and the 
cross-shareholding among keiretsu members. However, the new reality 
is that the influence of these factors has been significantly diminished. 
The decline in the use of each of these attributes of Japanese corporate 
culture has led firms to examine their corporate structures and to place 
greater emphasis on profitability and the return on investments. 
A. Cultural Elements Affecting Corporate Governance 
Decision-making processes in Japanese corporations differ from 
those in use in the U.S. For example, based on the Japanese philosophy 
of "ringiseido," participative decision-making from various levels is 
considered to stimulate group harmony and to provide a feeling of 
participation. 41 While it takes patience to work through the decision-
making process, those who have participated through the "ringi" 
process see it as their responsibility to implement the decision. The 
strength of communication and mutual understanding among multiple 
levels of management played an important part in the development of 
the corporate culture while also providing trust and stability that 
allowed firms to reduce monitoring and reporting costs. However, as 
decisions are based on a consensus, where no one decision-maker can 
be identified, the process is very weak on accountability. 
Another unique feature of the Japanese governance system has 
been that banks, which were key shareholders of many firms, frequently 
served as external monitors in charge of a corporation's governance. A 
"main bank," generally had a very special relationship with one or more 
companies and served multiple functions: providing loans, serving as a 
major shareholder and dispatching their own staff to serve as company 
39. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt., Choice as Regulatory Reform: The 
Case of Japanese Corporate Governance, at http://ssm.com/abstract=537843 (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2005). 
40. See Masamitsu Shiseki et. al, 2002 Revision of Commercial Code of Japan, 1658 
BANKING L. J. 64 (2002). 
41. See Ilan Alon, Japanese Corporate Management in Transition, at 
http://aib.msu.edu/publications/insights/insights_ v3nl .pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). 
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officers.42 These "main banks" were positioned at the very core of 
corporate governance. Ryuji Konishi, a former managing director of 
Long Term Credit Bank, speaking about the role of banks in corporate 
governance noted: 
Banks centered on top of the government system. Banks 
intervened in a company's management at the time of its 
financial distress. Banks reinforced mutual relationship 
among stakeholders through cross shareholdings. Banks 
thought it was them who maintained and drove the system. 
They thought they were the Governor of the system. All the 
stakeholders' relationship and even the Market were often 
internalized by the banks and there had been lack of [sic] 
pure outsiders' check system. It is quite an irony that they 
thought they were the master of the system and ordered 
others to do this and that for restructure, proved merely a 
puppet of MOP and awfully inept to tackle with their own 
restructuring. 43 
Also unique to Japan is the nature of "cross shareholding" among 
companies, particularly with banks. Initially, cross shareholding 
centered on the former zaibatsu groups for the purpose of preventin~ the 
hoarding of stock after the liberalization of securities in the 1950s. In 
the 1960s cross shareholding was used by companies with close 
business relationships, such as keiretsu or corporate groups, and to 
prevent stock acquisition by foreign companies. In the 1980s cross 
shareholding aggressively promoted large volume equity financing 
during the "bubble" economy period. Benefits of cross-shareholding 
include stable management as the shareholders back the managers and 
reinforcement of existing business relations especially if the returns 
from the stock investments in partner firms increase in value. 
Each of these components of Japanese corporate culture has 
changed, some of them quite dramatically, in the last two decades. 
Globalization has forced many firms to move operations into China and 
elsewhere so the process of continually hiring new university graduates 
42. See, e.g., Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and 
Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 0RG. 399, 402 (1989); MITSUAKI 0KABE, CROSS 
SHAREHOLDINGS IN JAPAN 27 (2003). 
43. Ryuji Konishi, Japanese Bank's Failure, Remarks at Asian Conference in Harvard 
Business School (Feb. 6, 1999). 
44. See Kuroki, supra note 5, at 1. 
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and impliedly guaranteeing them life-long employment has had to be 
discarded at many firms. Thus, the close relationships among workers 
and their managers, most of whom were lifetime employees, are 
changing. The main bank's role has likewise declined. Due to the 
deterioration of the banks due to bad loan problems, bank financing has 
been gradually replaced by fund procurement in capital markets. As a 
result, the main bank's influence on corporate governance has 
diminished. Similarly, although cross-shareholding brought benefits 
when stock prices rose, as prices continued to drop, firms began to sell 
cross-shareholdings. In the last decade both stable long-term 
shareholding and cross shareholdings have decreased significantly, with 
cross-shareholding falling to 7 .2% in 2002, only half the level that 
existed a decade earlier.45 
As a result of the changes, more firms are now without strong bank 
financiers and keiretsu allies, who can be counted on to help look after 
their common interests. To be competitive in the global marketplace 
both the sourcing and methods of operations and the attraction of 
needed capital have to be more in line with global standards. Firms 
looking for global recognition, markets and capital were expected to 
eliminate corporate scandals and "to attain better performance through 
an enhanced corporate governance structure." 46 In matters specifically 
related to corporate governance, the firms found that the U.S. system 
operated as a de facto global standard.47 
B. Recognition of the need for Corporate Governance Reform 
In addition to experiencing the changes occurring in Japanese 
corporate culture, the occurrence of several scandals in the late nineteen 
nineties and the early years of the new millennium convinced many 
executives and their advisors that compliance with legal and social 
standards, along with meeting higher investment performance 
expectations, are keys to corporate governance. Attorney Hideaki 
Kubori notes, 
Nowadays, just one inappropriate act by an on-site 
employee can destroy a brand name and ruin a company. The 
45. See Kuroki, supra note 5, at 1. 
46. See Hideaki Miyajima, Sen Taku ni Chokumnen suru Nihon Kigyo [Japanese 
Corporations at the Crossroad], Waseda.com on Asahi.com, 2003/09/07, available at 
http://organization.web.waseda.ac.jp/finance/2003314.pdf. 
47. Etsuko Katsu, GLOBAL CAPITAL REVOLUTION 14, 21, 25 (TOYO KEIZAI SHINPOSHA 
1998). 
14
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2005], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/2
2005] Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Japan 
time is now for top management to urgently build a system in 
which compliance takes root, through methods most suited to 
the company. If compliance is deficient, the all-important 
brand image will be seriously tainted. And damage to brand 
leads directly to the collapse of company organization. A 
definitive example is the food poisoning incident at 
Yukijirushi that began on June 27, 2000, the day before the 
shareholders meeting. 48 
203 
Another important aspect of corporate governance is to attain 
better performance. If companies do not take reasonable risks, better 
performance (return) cannot be created. Professor Takeaki Kariya of 
Meiji University concludes, "No uncertainty, no need for 
management. "49 
As board members were almost always also corporate managers, 
the composition of the boards made it unlikely that the board would 
monitor managers. Instead, statutory auditors functioned to monitor 
both the execution of actions taken by the board and the internal control 
and conduct of the company. 50 Although statutory auditors are used in 
several countries, their role is not well understood. The statutory auditor 
generally exists as a means of "monitoring the legal conformity of 
business conducted by directors."51 Generally, statutory auditors in 
Japan have been executives of other companies, people from a firm's 
main bank, its lawyers, or people with which the firm has continuing 
business relationships. 
In 2001, the Commercial Code was revised to strengthen the 
auditing system in several respects. Nobuo Nakamura, Professor of Law 
at W aseda University explains several of the changes. First, the revision 
requires that a resigning auditor be granted the right to state his or her 
opinions at the shareholders meeting. 52 Second, the length of term 
served by a statutory auditor was extended from three to four years as of 
48. See Kubori, supra note 6, at 1. 
49. See Takeaki Kariya, Fudosan Kinyukogaku towa nanika [What is the financial 
engineering about real estate?], TOYO KEIZAI SHIMPOSHA, at 17 (2003). 
50. COMMERCIAL CODE OF JAPAN, § 274 (1), at 
http://www.kansa.or.jp/english/com_Ol .html (last visited Mar. 23, 2005 [hereinafter 
COMMERCIAL CODE]. 
51. See J-IRIS Research Newsletter, Issue No. 2, at 4 (Oct. 2002), available at 
http://www.j-iris.com/newsletter/n 102/pdf. 
52. See Noburo Nakamura, Corporate Governance in Japan: Today and Tomorrow, 
34 JAPAN ECON. CURRENTS 6 (July 2003), at http://www.kkc-usa.org/files/3177/JEC-July-
03-132K.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
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December 2001. s3 It also increased the number of statutory outside 
auditors to three or more and requires that the majority of auditors be 
from outside the firm. s4 Under the new definition outside statutory 
auditors must not presently be, nor have been a director, a general 
manager, or an employee in some other capacity of the company or its 
subsidiaries.ss Finally, the 2001 revisions require "the board of 
directors of large corporations to secure approval from the board of 
statutory auditors before submitting a slate of statutory auditors for 
approval at a shareholders meeting."s6 As of the first shareholders' 
meeting occurring after May 1, 2005, the 2001 Code revisions impose 
the changes on the statutory auditors of all firms not opting for the new 
"Company with Committees" governance system. 
C. The 2003 Revisions in the Japanese Commercial Code 
Prior to the April 1, 2003 changes to the Commercial Code, aside 
from the role of the statutory auditors, boards in Japanese firms 
appeared to serve the same function as their U.S. counterparts. s7 The 
board of directors elected by shareholders (and thus responsible to 
them) sets overall corporate policies and direction and appoints and 
monitors the company executives who implement these policies. The 
reality, however, was that as the members of the board were all from 
inside the firm, the interests of the employees, as distinct from the 
interests of individual managers and employees, was paramount in the 
board's decision-making. 
The distinction between oversight and operational functions has 
not been clear because the members of the board of directors were also 
executives in charge of company operations. The Code acknowledges 
the dual role of board members. According to Commercial Code § 260 
( 1 ), "The board of directors decides the operation of a company and 
monitors the execution of directors. ,,ss The reality of the governance 
structure of Japanese companies has been as follows: 
53. COMMERCIAL CODE § 273 (1 ). 
54. The Japanese Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning 
Audits, etc. of Corporations§ 18 (1). 
55. See id. 
56. Nakamura, supra note 52, at 7. 
57. See Stephen Prowse, Corporate Governance in International Perspective: A Survey 
of Corporate Control Mechanisms Among Large Firms in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan and Germany, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS ECON. PAPERS No. 41, 43 
(July 1994). 
58. COMMERCIAL CODE§ 274 (1). 
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1. Almost all directors are appointed or, to be more exact, 
promoted internally. 
2. Almost all directors are also executives or managers who 
therefore face conflicts on many matters. There is no clear 
distinction between monitoring and operating. 
3. The outgoing CEO usually appoints a new CEO. 
4. The power and authority of CEOs is often not questioned. 
The 2003 revised Commercial Code gives companies three options 
for their governance system: (1) keep their conventional governance 
system; (2) establish a decision-making committee regarding major 
assets in addition to a corporate auditor system; or (3) establish a new 
corporate governance structure known as the "Company with 
Committees" system.59 For companies electing the first choice, the only 
change in the decision-making of the board is the change required for 
the statutory auditor. As for the second choice, the purpose of setting up 
a major asset committee is for it to make decisions relative to the 
disposal of important assets of a company. Traditionally, only the board 
of directors could make such decisions.60 The determination by a firm to 
have a major asset committee can be decided by a board of at least 10 
members and one outside director. The major asset committee must be 
composed of at least three board members.61 Although to date only 
Honda has adopted this system, it is anticipated more companies will do 
so. Honda explained its adoption of this system in its recent financial 
report: "[I]n order to ensure proactive decision-making, the Board of 
Directors set up an Assets and Loan Management Committee, which is 
responsible for making decisions related to the disposal of the 
Company's important assets. "62 If the third choice is elected, three 
committees and the representative corporate officer system replace the 
conventional corporate auditor system. Toshiba Corporation captures 
the possible benefits of the new governance system: 
[U]nder the previous Commercial Code, the board of 
59. The Japanese Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning 
Audits, etc. of Corporations at § 1-2 (3). 
60. See id.§ 1-3 (1). 
61. See id.§ 1-3 (3). 
62. HONDA MOTOR Co., Consolidated Financial Results for the Fiscal Second Quarter 
and the First Half Ended September 30, 2003, at 
http://world.honda.com/investors/financialresult/2004/2003 _2nd/25 .html (last visited Mar. 
24, 2005) (discussing management of the company). 
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directors was legally responsible for both execution and 
supervision. Under Japan's revised Commercial Code, the 
Company with Committees system articulates a division of 
legal responsibility between the executive officers and the 
board: It provides for executive officers to execute business, 
while the board concentrates on supervision of management. 
Executive officers will be able to act with greater agility and 
mobility to meet the challenges of the business 
environment. 63 
The committees required include an audit committee, nominating 
committee and compensation committee. As the Toshiba note suggests, 
the major change with this system is that firms must transfer to 
executives who are not members of the board the responsibility for 
running the business. 64 
D. Governance Under the "Company with Committees" System 
Toshiba explained the purpose for its adoption of the new 
governance system "as a means to further enhance corporate 
governance by reinforcing supervisory functions and manaf ement 
transparency and to improve operating agility and flexibility. "6 Other 
companies that select this option likely anticipate that as they become 
more accountable, they will also be more competitive by increasing 
their corporate value and eliminating corporate corruption through the 
enhanced corporate governance system. 
The audit committee monitors both the appropriateness and the 
legal conformity of business carried out by both directors and executive 
officers.66 The selection of external auditors must be approved by 
shareholders and the audit committee is empowered to submit to 
shareholders a proposal to elect and remove external auditors. 67 All 
members of the audit committee are prohibited from serving as 
executive officers or employees of the company or any subsidiary, and 
63. TOSHIBA CORPORATION, Toshiba to adopt "Company with Committees System," 
available at http://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/press/2003_01/pr2903.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 
2005). 
64. The Japanese Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code concerning 
Audits, etc. of Corporations§ 21-5 (1). 
65. See TOSHIBA, supra note 63. 
66. HIROSHI MAEDA ET. AL, CORPORATE KAIKAKU No ZITSUMU [CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICE UNDER THE REVISED COMMERCIAL CODE] 236 (Nihon Keizai 
Shinbunsha 2003). 
67. See id. at 237. 
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from holding management position in any subsidiary. 68 There is, 
however, no provision that would bar keiretsu member representatives 
or others who have a material relationship with a firm from being on the 
audit committee. The nominating committee determines the content of 
proposals pertaining to the election and removal of directors at 
shareholders meeting. The board of directors retains the right to elect 
and remove members of the committees; the nominating committee is 
not involved in that function. The compensation committee determines 
the compensation for each director and executive officer. At least three 
board members are to be on each committee with the majority of 
committee members being outside directors. 
As far as the independence of board members, company executives 
may serve as members of the nominating or compensation committee, 
but not of the auditing committee. 69 Committee members cannot be 
regarded as outside directors if: ( 1) they are current or former 
employees, or (2) they are current or former directors working at the 
same time as executive officers of the company.70 Despite the changes, 
the newly revised Code in Japan does not ensure a board in this new 
system will be composed mostly of independent members who can 
perform the monitoring function without a conflict. This is because the 
Code does not require that corporations adopting the new system have a 
majority of outside directors on the board. 7 Indeed, it permits directors 
concurrently serving as executive officers to constitute a majority. 
Moreover, the definition of "an outside director" does not require 
independence. Therefore, directors from a parent company, from a main 
bank or from companies with material relationships can be considered 
as outside directors. Thus, the definition of what makes a director 
independent is less restricted in Japan than in the U.S. 
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN U.S. CORPORATIONS 
The reforms imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and the 
NYSE and NASDAQ rules require U.S. corporations to address a 
number of governance issues related to the size and composition of 
boards, the independence of board members, the separation of the CEO 
and chairman positions and several other related concerns. An 
examination of what is happening with these concerns in the 30 DJ 
68. The Japanese Law for Special Exceptions to the Commercial Code Concerning 
Audits, etc. of Corporations § 21-8 (7). 
69. Id. at§ 21-8 (4). 
70. COMMERCIAL CODE § 188 (2), 7 .2. 
71. See MAEDA ET. AL., supra note 66, at 55. 
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Industrial firms is provided below. The role of the firm auditors and the 
expressed importance of non-shareholder stakeholders also are 
reviewed. 
The governance changes occurring at these firms have been quite 
extensive. For example, General Motors developed guidelines in thirty-
five areas ranging from the selection of new board members to the size 
of the board and the board's relationship with senior management.72 
GM's guidelines included those involving the selection and composition 
of the board, board leadership, the board's composition and 
performance, the board's relationship to senior management, meeting 
procedures, committee matters and leadership development. 73 General 
Electric' s Governance Principles include both the independence of 
directors and the independence of committee members. Meetings of 
non-employee directors, reporting concerns to non-employee directors 
and succession planning are also topics noted in the GE policies. 74 
A. Summary of Governance Structures at the 3 0 Dow Jones firms 
TABLE 1: Composite View of DJ 30 Boards and CEO Governance 
Board Size The average board has 12.5 members. 
Number of Inside The average number of inside 
Directors directors is 1.8. Only 6 firms have 
more than 2 inside directors. 
Who are the Inside The CEO and Chairman are the only 
Directors? inside directors at 16 firms. 
CEO & Chairman The CEO and Chairman are separated 
at 7 firms. The former Chair or 
President sits on 2 Boards. 
* Data is based on home pages as of July 1, 2004. 
Table 1 depicts a composite of the governance structure in the 
72. General Motors, Corporate Governance Guidelines, available at 
http://www.gm.com/company/investor_information/corp_gov/guidelines.html (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2005). 
73. Id. 
74. General Electric, Governance Principles, available at 
http://www.ge.com/en/spotlight/ commitment/ governance/ governance_principles.htm (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2005). 
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Dow Jones 30 as of July 1, 2004, and by extension in corporate 
America. The data shows the size of the board averages just over 12 
members, with only one or two inside directors and with a firm's CEO 
also being the chairman of the board. 
Table 2, which depicts the size and number of inside members of 
the boards at each of the 30 Dow Jones' firms, shows board size varies 
from as few as 9 members at Hewlett-Packard to as many as 17 at SBC. 
The average number of members is 12.5, with eight firms having 11 
members and six having 12. Although one might expect most boards to 
have an odd number of members, in fact 60% of the thirty firms have an 
even number of members. 
TABLE 2: Board Size and Number of Inside Directors at DJ 30 
Firms 
Firms Board Number ot Position of Insiders 
size inside directors 
3M Company 11 1 
iAlcoa Inc. 11 1 
~ltria Group 10 1 
~erican 13 ~ Chairman &CEO 
[Express 
~T&TCorp. 10 1 
!Boeing Co. 10 ~ President & CEO, Non-executive 
Chairman 
Caterpillar Inc. 14 1 
Citigroup 16 3 Chairman, CEO, President &COO 
Coca-Cola Co 16 1 
DuPont 12 1 
Eastman Kodak 11 1 
Exxon Mobil 11 3 Chairman & CEO, President, 
[Executive Vice President 
General Electric 16 5 Chairman & CEO, Vice Chairman 
Co. ''3) 
General Motors 11 1 
l-!ome Depot Inc 12 1 
Hewlett-Packard ~ ~ Chairman & CEO, Fonner 
Chairman 
l-!oneywell Int] 14 1 
Inc. 
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Intel Corp. 11 ~ Chairman, CEO, President & COO 
IBM 12 1 
Intl Paper Co. 11 l2 Chairman & CEO, President 
JP Morgan Chase 16 l2 Chairman & CEO, President 
Johnson & 13 l2 Chairman & CEO, Executive Vice 
Johnson [President &CFO 
McDonald 12 2 Non-Executive Chairman, Presiden1 
&CEO, 
Merck&Co 12 1 
Microsoft Corp. 10 3 Chairman, CEO, Former Presiden1 
&COO 
Procter & 16 1 
(Jamb le 
SBC 17 1 
~nited 12 1 
rr echnologies 
rwal-Mart Stores 14 ~ Chairman, Vice Chairman, CEO, 
Chairman of the Executive 
Committee 
!Walt-Disney Co. 11 B Chairman, CEO, President & COO 
Total 374 55 
* When the column is blank, the only insider is the CEO. 
** Data based on the firms' home page's as of July 1, 2004. 
As noted in Table 2, at the DJ 30 firms, each board of directors is 
composed of at least nine members, with an average of 12.5, and 
usually only one or two are inside directors. At 16 of the DJ 30 firms, 
the CEO, who is on all of the boards (or CEO who is also the chair) is 
the only insider. At two firms, Microsoft and HP, a former chairman or 
president is also on the board. Where two insiders are on the board, they 
are most commonly the CEO and a separate chairman. Only two boards, 
General Electric and Wal-Mart, have more than three insiders. 
It is in this area that the greatest contrast between U.S. and 
Japanese boards exists. While almost all U.S. firms' directors are 
outsiders, in Japan almost all board members are insiders. Japanese 
boards are less worried about monitoring the insiders than ensuring that 
the board members have the knowledge to make strategic decisions for 
the firm. Most officers in Japanese companies believe outsiders are less 
effective because they have less knowledge about the operations and 
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issues facing the company. Board members who are primarily outsiders 
will need to rely too much on the views and desires of those insiders. 
A. Independence of Board Members 
Having independent board members can be critical as American 
Express' s experience exemplifies. In 1992, the board, at the behest of 
several independent members, forced Board Chairman James Robinson 
to resign.75 Today, the governance policies at American Express define 
an independent director as follows: 
"A director is independent if he or she does not have a material 
relationship with the Company."76 Several specific situations include 
having an immediate family member who was employed as an officer 
of a subsidiary or being an executive of a company that does business 
with the firm and whose annual revenues from that business exceeds 
1 % of either company's business.77 As of January 24, 2004, the board 
determined that "nine of the Company's 12 incumbent directors were 
independent under these guidelines."78 
Citigroup has a long-standing commitment to an independent 
board and stock ownership as the two most important components of its 
corporate governance policies. Furthermore, Citigroup has adopted a 
new policy that seeks to eliminate interlocking directorships. 
Citigroup's governance policies include the following statements: 
Director Independence: We have adopted corporate 
governance guidelines requiring that at least two thirds of 
our board should be independent.79 
Stock ownership commitment: Directors and members of 
Citigroup agree that as directors they will continue to hold 
at least 7 5% of the Citigroup stock that they own for at least 
a minimum specified period ... 80 
75. See MONKS & MINNOW, supra note 21, at 347. 
76. American Express Company, Corporate Governance Principle, available at 




79. Citigroup, Corporate Governance, available at 
http://www.citigroupinfo.com/ citigroup/ corporategovemance/ data/corpgovguide. pdf (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2005). 
80. Id. 
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Interlocking Directors: No inside director or executive 
officer of Citigroup shall serve as a director of a company 
where a Citigroup outside Director is an executive officer.81 
Finally, "Boeing's existing governance principles call for a 
'substantial majority of independent, non-management directors.' 
Indeed, nine of the eleven members of Boeing's board of directors are 
considered 'independent' under the NYSE's proposed tighter definition. 
Boeing's board of directors also has regular executive meetings without 
management present, another NYSE recommendation. "82 
B. Separation of CEO and Chairman Positions 
If the chairman of the board of directors is also the CEO of the 
company, how can the board, under the leadership of its chairman, 
monitor the CEO and other executive managers of the company? If 
governance at a corporation is to include monitoring of executives by 
the board, the need to separate the positions of chairman of the board 
and CEO of the company seems obvious. In early 2003, the conference 
board recommended that the CEO and chairman positions be split with 
the chairman position filled by an independent director. 83 
Among the Dow Jones 30 firms, only seven separate the position 
of CEO and chairman of the board: Boeing, Microsoft, McDonald, 
Intel, Wal-Mart, Walt Disney and Citigroup. In the remaining 76.6% of 
the 30 companies, the chairman of the board was also the CEO of the 
company. Several firms expressed strong reasons for their decision to 
separate the two positions. The Guidelines for Intel Corporation's 
Board of Directors specifically require the separation of the position of 
Chairman and CEO as an aid in the board's oversight of management. 
"The Board's general policy, based on experience, is that the positions 
of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer should be held 
by separate Eersons as an aid in the Board's oversight of 
Management." 4 At Boeing, the company separated the position of CEO 
81. Id. 
82. Boeing Company, Corporate Governance: Ahead of the Game, Boeing Frontiers 
Online, Sept. 2002, Vol. 1, Issue 5, available at 
http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/2002/september/i_fofl .html (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2005). 
83. Commission on Public Trust and Public Enterprise, Report of the Conference 
Board, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, INC. Jan. 9, 2003. 
84. Intel Corporation, Corporate Governance Guidelines-Intel Corporation Board of 
Directors Guidelines on Significant Corporate Governance Issues, available at 
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and non-executive chairman on December 1, 2003. Lew Platt, non-
executive chairman, explained his new position by saying that: "I can 
take that load away from [Boeing President and CEO] Harry 
[Stonecipher] and focus on all the issues of running the Board, chairing 
the Board meetings, setting up the agenda for the meetings and handling 
all the governance issues."85 While such a split is not the norm in either 
the United States or Japan, in the United Kingdom 95% of the 350 
largest companies listed on the London Stock Exchange do split those 
positions. 86 
In the U.S., the desirability of separating the two positions is 
subject to debate. The rationale for keeping one person in the two 
positions is not based on the board exercising its monitoring function, 
but on ensuring that only one person is in charge of the firm. A 
respondent to the 1992 Korn/Ferry survey concluded, "They should be 
the same person. If they are not, the Chairman would be a figure-head 
or would usurp the role of the CE0."87 This view appears to be the 
dominant one in most of the top U.S. corporations. In 1998, CEOs were 
also the Chairmen of 93% of the largest companies. Our survey shows 
that in 2004, CEOs were Chairmen in 23 (77%) of DJ 30 firms. 88 
The corporate governance guidelines of AT&T state: "the 
Company's by-laws provide that the Company's Chief Executive 
Officer shall also serve as the Company's Chairman of the Board. The 
Board believes this policy has served it well in the past and continues to 
serve it well at present."89 Until recently, Michael Eisner held both 
positions at Disney. However, the 2004 shareholders' meeting at Walt 
Disney World was one of the most divisive in history for the firm as 
compared to meetings of other firms facing critical problems. Most of 
the issues centered on then CEO and Chairman Michael Eisner, who 
retained the position of CEO, but not the Chairman's role. Former 
http://www.intel.com/intel/finance/corp_gov.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). 
85. Boeing Frontiers Online, Off and Running-Harry Stonecipher and Lew Platt 
Explain Where They See Boeing Going and What They Expect From the Company's People 
and Programs (March 2004 ), available at 
http://www.boeing.com/new/frontiers/archive/2004/february/i_qa.html (last visited Mar. 22, 
2005). 
86. See Associated Press, Rachel Beck, Firms that Split Top Roles See Higher Stock 
Returns (Oct. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.macon.com/mld/cctimes/business/9965623.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005). 
87. Korn /Ferry International, Board of Directors, Fourteenth Annual Study (1992). 
88. Korn /Ferry International, Board of Directors, Twentieth Annual Study (1998); see 
Table 1 for 2004 data at DJ 30 firms. 
89. AT&T, Corporate Guidelines, available at http://www.att.com/ir/cg/cgg.html (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2005). 
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Senator George Mitchell, an Eisner supporter, later was made 
Chairman. 
Shareholder representatives, who view the board as representing 
their interests, are increasingly calling for a separation of the position of 
chairman and CE0.90 Harold Green, former CEO and chairman of ITT 
Corp., poses the problem encountered when the CEO is on the board, 
whether as Chairman or as an inside member. "If the board of directors 
is really there to represent the interest of the stockholders, why is the 
chief executive on the board? Doesn't he have a conflict of interest? 
He's the professional manager. He cannot represent the shareholders 
and impartially sit in judgment of himself."91 The shareholders appear 
to be right in seeking to change the status quo. In terms of corporate 
performance two studies found that "companies with separate CEOs and 
chairmen consistently outperform those companies that combine the 
roles."92 
The 2004 study by Merrill Lynch's chief U.S. market strategist, 
Richard Bernstein, showed a 22% return for firms where the roles were 
split versus 18% where they were combined. 93 
C. Other Governance Characteristics in 3 0 DJ Companies 
Although most companies have adopted similar governance 
principles, a few have added details in critical areas while others have 
included principles not found in most other firms. We examined the 
role of the board's audit committee and the expressed importance of 
non-shareholder stakeholders. As the authority of a firm's audit 
committee has increased due to the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, we looked to see if corporate governance principles reflect the 
heightened role for this committee? Similarly, we looked at whether 
firms make any express commitments to stakeholders other than 
shareholders and if so, which interests are of greater importance? 
Both SOX and the NYSE requirements give the audit committee 
the sole authority to hire and fire a company's independent auditor and 
90. See Edward Iwata, To split, or not to split? USA TODAY, Mar. 17, 2004, at 48 
(referring to the California Public Employees' Retirement System (Calpers) and labor 
unions as supporting a split); see also TIAA-CREF defends investor interests with updated 
statement on corporate governance, TIAA-CREF BALANCE, Spring 2004, at 5 (explaining 
that the Policy Statement on Corporate Governance states, "If a board doesn't separate the 
positions of chairman and CEO, it should designate an individual who presides over 
executive sessions of independent directors."). 
91. See Egon Zehnder, International Corporate Issue Monitor, USA, IV, 1 (1989). 
92. Beck, supra note 86; MONKS & MINNOW, supra note 21, at 179-80. 
93. Beck, supra note 86. 
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to approve any significant non-audit relationship with the independent 
auditor.94 The committee also must have the ability to engage 
independent counsel and other expert advisors. Additionally, SOX 
requires the SEC to propose rules for certifying that one member of the 
audit committee is a "financial expert." The NYSE requires company 
boards to include nominating, compensation and audit committees, the 
same committees required under the revised Japanese Code's 
Committee system of governance. A major difference, however, is that 
unlike the Japanese law, the NYSE rules require these committees to be 
composed solely of independent directors.95 As the law imposes rather 
specific requirements related to the audit committee's role, we found the 
governance provisions for this committee to be similar at most firms. 96 
The governance principles at Boeing exemplify such provisions. At 
Boeing: 
Boeing's board of directors already has Audit, 
Compensation, Finance, and Governance and Nominating 
committees. Only non-employee directors may serve on 
these committees. Audit committee members must be 
'independent,' pursuant to NYSE rules. All key committees 
have written charters that address their purpose, goals and 
responsibilities . . . . The audit committee is responsible for 
evaluating and selecting outside auditors, subject to 
ratification by the full board. [It] also reviews the external 
auditor's annual audit plan and report. The board of 
directors, or any of its committees, may seek legal or other 
expert advice from an independent source outside of the 
company.97 
As for stakeholders, several DJ 30 firms have express governance 
statements relating to stakeholders. Walt Disney states that it has a 
responsibility to the communities where it operates as well as to its 
shareholders. It requires management to report on its responsibilities to 
the board and notes that the board shall reflect the diversity of the 
94. See SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title IV,§ 301, 116 Stat. 789; Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, Release No. 34-48745, 81 SEC Docket 1586, ~6 (Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter 
SEC Release No. 34-48745]. 
95. SEC Release No. 34-48745, supra note 94 (approving requirements stated in the 
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A). 
96. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title IV,§ 301, 116 Stat. 789. 
97. Boeing Company, supra note 82. 
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Corporation's shareholders, employees, customers, guests and 
communities: 
The Corporation has a responsibility to the communities 
in which it operates, as well as to its shareholders. To allow 
appropriate Board review and input, management shall 
prepare and present to the Board an annual review of the 
policies, practices and contributions made in fulfillment of 
the Corporation's social responsibilities. In addition, 
management shall report annually on its diversity efforts and 
the results thereof. The Board shall reflect the diversity of the 
Corporation's shareholders, employees, customers, guests 
and communities.98 
While most corporations note that customers are one of their 
important stakeholders, Hewlett Packard's (HP's) corporate objectives 
highlight the customer focus more clearly than do other firms. HP 
emphasizes loyalty to the customer as the top priority, followed by 
making a profit and creating value for the shareholders. HP' s Corporate 
Objectives have guided the company in the conduct of its business since 
1957, when first written by co-founders Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard. 
Microsoft notes that selecting board members requires a consideration 
of many factors. Note, however, that it seeks to recommend for its 
board a group that can best "represent shareholder interest." Thus, 
while its board, like Disney's, should have a diversity of experiences, it 
seeks members who will represent the shareholders, not a diverse group 
of stakeholders. Microsoft employs a similar approach to HP, noting: 
In evaluating the suitability of individual Board 
members, the Board . . . evaluates each individual in the 
context of the Board as a whole, with the objective of 
recommending a group that can best perpetuate the success 
of the Company's business and represent shareholder 
interests through the exercise of sound judgment, using its 
diversity of experience. 99 (emphasis added) 
Kodak's commitment to corporate governance and to various 
98. Walt Disney Company, Corporate Governance Guidelines, available at 
http://www.corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/guidelines.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
99. Microsoft Corporation, Corporate Governance Guidelines, available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/msft/govemance/guidelines.mspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
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stakeholders is reflected in the 2003 publication of its "Corporate 
Responsibility Principles." 100 The Principles place importance on high 
ethical standards, obeying the laws, conducting business activities in an 
environmentally responsible manner, respecting the privacy rights of its 
employees, customers and suppliers, and maintaining a philanthropic 
program. Kodak also brought corporate governance issues into its 
management structure by appointing, in July 2003, the company's first 
chief governance officer. The chief governance officer is responsible for 
leading the company's efforts to comply with government and New 
York Stock Exchange mandates and to identify and adopt best practices 
in the corporate governance arena. The person is to perform ongoing 
assessments of the governance practices and structure of the company's 
board of directors, and will identify opportunities for improvement. It 
will be interesting to see if many other companies follow Kodak's 
example of assigning a high-level person to specifically look at 
governance issues. Could the CGO follow the CIO as new executive 
positions in major firms? 
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPANESE CORPORATIONS 
As of July 1, 2004 approximately 90 companies in Japan have 
adopted the "Company with Committees" system. 101 After the 2003 
shareholders meeting, the first held under the revised Commercial Code, 
some forty-five companies changed their corporate governance structure 
by adopting the "Company with Committees" system. While 45 more 
companies subsequently adopted the new system, most Japanese 
companies express misgivings about adopting U.S.-style corporate 
governance and they have not changed their corporate governance 
structure. 
A. Summary of Governance Structure 
According to a survey conducted by the Japanese Investor 
Relations and Investor Support, Inc., the average size of a board at 
1,616 firms of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is 11.7. The average at the 
NIKKEi 225 firms is a little larger, 15.5 as of the end of June 2003. 
Both figures are comparable to the 12.5 average we found, as of June 
2004, for the DJ 30 firms. As for outside directors, the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange firms average 1.0 outside directors while the NIKKEi 225 
100. Eastman Kodak Company, Corporate Responsibility Principles, available at 
http://www.kodak.com/US/en/corp/principles/principles.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
101. See Nihon Keizai Shinbun, NIKKEL, Aug. 22, 2004, at I. 
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average 0.8 outside directors. 102 Even though firms adopting the new 
governance system added outside directors to their boards, inside 
directors still dominate at those firms as well as at all other Japanese 
firms. In about 75% of the companies that adopted the "Company with 
Committees" governance system, the . number of inside directors 
exceeds the number of outside directors. 103 
TABLE 3: Major Japanese Firms Where Outside Directors 
Dominate 
APAN TELECOM CO., LTD. 
-PHONE Co., Ltd. #2 
OYA CORPORATION 
esona Holdin s, Inc. 
OilMA CORPORATION 
itachi Kokusai Electric Inc. 
* The 2004 data is shown with ( ) being the number as of July 1, 2004, 
and is based on the firms' home pages. 
** The 2003 data is based on the list of Companies that moved to 
"Company with Committees" system, No. 1669 Shozi Homu, (July 2003). 
# 1 Vodafone Holdings since December 2003. 
#2VodafoneK.K. since October 2003. 
As noted in Table 3, firms where outside directors are dominant 
include Hoya Corp., Japan Telecom holdings, Seiyu, Ltd., and Resona 
102. See Research by Japan Investor Relations and Investor Support, Inc., available at 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/cgi/jp/columns/colurnns_O 12.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
103. See The list of Companies that moved to the "Company with Committees" system, 
No. 1669 Shozi Homu 33 (July 2003), at 33 [hereinafter List of Companies that Moved]. 
Fifty-five companies, including 14 Nomura Securities group companies, adopted the 
"Company with Committees" system. Ten of them have boards with a majority of outside 
directors. Id. 
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Bank. 104 In most cases, the outside directors include a large number of 
lawyers and academics. Even where there are outside directors, they 
may not be considered independent. At the June 2004 Hitachi group 
shareholders meeting, the independence of some outside directors was 
strictly questioned. Institutional Shareholder Service strongly argued 
that some of the outside directors would be unable to monitor the 
firm. 105 Some companies have reacted to the concern with an outside 
director' s independence. For example, Teijin, although it did not adopt 
the "Company with Committees" system, requires independence for its 
outside directors. Independence is defined as not having a material 
relationship that, in the opinion of the board, would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment. 106 
B. Why have some Corporations adopted the "Company with 
Committees" governance system? 
The reasons why companies have adopted the new system can be 
classified into four categories. The first category includes companies 
that are developing their business operations and raising funds globally. 
Toshiba, Sony, HOYA and Mitsubishi Electric exemplify these 
companies. The second category includes Japanese firms that are the 
affiliates of firms based outside Japan. They include Seiyu Ltd., the 
affiliate of Wal-Mart in the U.S., and Japan Telecom, the affiliate of 
Vodafone in the U .K. The third category includes companies trying to 
enhance a group-wide framework to be better able to respond to 
changing conditions. These firms now seek to operate by establishing a 
consolidated system rather than through numerous semi-independent 
units. The Hitachi group and the Nomura group are in this category. 
Finally, some firms, such as Resona Bank, were forced to adopt the new 
system in order to receive needed public funding. 
The CEOs of the firms that have adopted the new "Company with 
Committees" system seem pleased with the change, particularly as it 
relates to outside directors. According to a survey of CEOs from 41 
companies that adopted the new system in the first year, almost all 
(84%) felt that the presence of outside directors enhanced and 
104. See Table 3 infra (provides a complete list of the firms having a majority of 
outside directors). 
105. See U.S. Style Governance at the Second Year, NIKKEi WEEKLY, July 6, 2004, at 
15. 
106. See Independence, NIKKEi WEEKLY, June 6, 2004 at 3. (According to their 
definition, three of the ten directors at Teijin would be regarded as independent). 
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revitalized their boards.107 A clear majority ( 63 % ) also reported quicker 
decision-making. Two-thirds of the CEOs report they would also like to 
increase the opportunity to discuss items of importance with the outside 
directors. 108 Specific examples of firms in each category that have 
changed their methods of corporate governance are noted in the 
following section. 
C. Corporations that have changed to the "Company with Committees" 
System 
1. Changes made due to the global nature of the firm 
Sony Corporation changed its governance system because it has 
global business operations and raises capital through global markets. 109 
Sony has a long history of continually modifying its management and 
organization structures to better adapt to changing business 
environments. When it was listed on the NYSE in 1970, it appointed 
two outside directors. 110 In 1991, Sony appointed a non-Japanese as an 
outside director and in 1997 it separated the oversight and business 
operation functions within the company by reorganizing the Board and 
establishing Japan's first corporate executive officer ("Shikko-yakuin") 
system. 111 In 2000, the position of chairman of the board was created 
and in 2002, it created an advisory board to enhance board of directors' 
discussions with expert outside advice. That same year the distinction in 
roles between directors and corporate executive officers was further 
clarified by abolishing rank-titles for directors. 112 
Sony not only adopted the "Company with Committees" system in 
June 2003, it also introduced internal standards for a separation between 
the chairman of the board of directors and representative corporate 
executive officers. In addition, it imposed qualifications for board 
candidates so as to eliminate conflicts of interest and changed the 
composition of the board's nominating and compensation committees 
so that a majority of members on each committee are to be outside 
directors. After its June 2003 shareholders meeting, Sony announced 
l 07. See Survey, NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN (NIKKEi), June 26, 2004, at 6. 
108. Id. 
109. SONY CORPORATION, Reforming the Sony Group Management Structure to 
Strengthen Corporate Governance, available at 
http://www.sony.net/Sonylnfo/News/Press/200301/03-004E/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
llO. Id. 
ll l. Id. 
112. SONY, supra note 109. 
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that the total number of directors would be 16 (an increase from 11 in 
2002), with 8 being outside directors. Three representative corporate 
executive officers and five corporate executive officers also served as 
directors. Despite the changes made by Sony, some critics feel it has not 
gone far enough. Nikkei Business surveyed asset fund managers from 
132 management companies and 67 insurance companies regarding the 
board ranking of both good and bad firms. Based on responses from 104 
managers, Sony ranked as both the sixth best company and the sixth 
worst. 113 The comments said that Sony's governance was bad because it 
neither put importance on shareholders' value nor provided sufficient 
disclosure of executive compensation. A fund manager criticized what it 
called "Sony shock" when a top executive suddenly lowered the 
earnings estimate shortly after providing a very optimistic forecast. 
Similarly, although there was a motion at the general meeting of 
shareholders to disclose executive compensation, it was defeated. 114 
According to Sony's 2004 annual report, "at the general meeting of 
shareholders held on June 22, 2004, shareholders elected 16 directors, 
including 8 outside directors. At the subsequent board of directors 
meeting, members of three statutory committees and 15 corporate 
executive officers, including the two representative corporate executive 
officers, were determined."115 
2. Changes made due to firm being a part of non-Japanese based group 
In order to enhance the group strategy as an affiliate of Vodafone 
of the U.K., Japan Telecom (JT) moved to the "Company with 
Committees" system. As of June 2004, it had 10 directors with 7 from 
outside the firm. Seiyu also now uses the "Company with Committees" 
system to enhance its partnership with Wal-Mart. Sei~'s Board had 12 
directors, 7 of whom are from outside in June 2003. 1 6 Of the firm's 11 
executive officers, 5 were also directors. 117 The size of board was 
reduced to eleven in June 2004. 
113. See Board Ranking in 2003, NIKKEi WEEKLY BUSINESS, Jan. 12, 2003, at 39. 
114. See id. at 40. 
115. SONY CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE, available at 
http://www.sony.net/Sony Info/IR/financial/ar/2004/ qfhh 7 cOOOOOOeedh-
att/Corporate_ Govemance. pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
116. See The List of Companies that Moved, supra note 103, at 39. 
117. Id. 
33
Toda and McCarty: Corporate Governance Changes In The Two Largest Economies: What's
Published by SURFACE, 2005
222 Syracuse J. Int' I L. & Com. [Vol. 32: 189 
3. Changes made to have a group-wide system for organizational 
strategy 
Hitachi Limited and the Hitachi Group of companies exemplify 
firms that have adopted the new governance system so that it and its 
affiliates can respond more quickly to needed business reorganizations 
or strategic opportunities. On January 30, 2003, Hitachi Ltd. announced 
that the Hitachi Group would radically alter its corporate governance 
structure by adopting a new structure.1 18 The key goals for the new 
system include: 
( 1) Dramatic improvement in speed of management; 
(2) More transparent management practices; 
(3) To improve the group companies' management strategy; and 
(4) To enhance global management119 
To achieve these goals, Hitachi has made changes in its corporate 
governance. For example four non-affiliated individuals, with expertise 
in corporate manar:ement, administration and legal affairs, will become 
Hitachi directors. 20 The third goal, improvement of the group's 
management strategy, brings certain group companies' directors to 
Hitachi's Board for the first time and also moves several Hitachi 
directors and executive officers to the boards of group companies as 
outside directors. 121 This will greatly strengthen the oversight system for 
the entire group. In the June 2003 shareholders meeting of Hitachi Ltd., 
four outside directors were appointed while 33 board members from the 
parent, Hitachi Ltd., were elected to the boards of subsidiaries.122 
4. Changes made due to government requirement and receipt of public 
funds 
Resona Bank was essentially required or pressured into making a 
change in their corporate governance system. Resona was established in 
2002 as Japan's fifth largest bank by the merger of Osaka-based Daiwa 
Bank Holdings Inc. and Tokyo-based Asahi Bank. Several analysts 
described it as a marriage of weaklings.1 23 As Resona's external 
118. News Release, Hitachi, Ltd., Reinforcing Corporate Governance, available at 





123. CLARINET, Japanese Bank Resona to Cut 4,000 Jobs, Oct. 29, 2003, available at 
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auditors decided to apply stricter assessment of the value of deferred tax 
assets, the bank's capital ratio declined to around 2%, well below the 
required 4% level for domestic banks.124 At the end of March 2003, the 
Prime Minister and the Financial System Management Council decided 
to inject 2.3 trillion yen from public funds to eliminate concerns about 
the bank's future among depositors, customers, and investors.125 At the 
same time, the bank decided to replace old management, inviting 
directors from outside the group and adopting a "Company with 
Committees" system to strengthen corporate governance and make its 
management more transparent. 126 In June 2004, Resona reduced the size 
of the board from eleven to nine with three directors from inside and six 
from outside.127 Before the 2003 and 2004 changes, all 11 directors 
were from inside. 
D. Corporations that created their own system of corporate governance 
Two well-known Japanese global firms, Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. Ltd. (MEI) and Toyota Motor Co. (TMC), have each 
established a corporate governance system that blends features of 
traditional Japanese governance with U.S.-style governance. Their 
boards mainly focus on the monitoring function and deciding corporate 
strategy, while the decision making regarding daily operations is settled 
by executive officers at operational fronts. These firms are not seeking 
to completely isolate supervisory functions from execution functions, 
but instead want both operational and supervisory representatives on the 
board. 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. implemented a new group 
management system and established its new corporate governance 
system on April 23, 2003. Each of MEI' s business domain companies 
will have autonomous management while an Executive Officer System 
will be used to integrate the comprehensive strengths of all group 
companies. 128 The board of directors will elect executive officers, who 
http://quickstart.clari.net/ qs_se/webnews/wed/an?Qjpan-banking-resona.R T-y _DOU .html 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
124. Resona Bank, Establishing New Corporate Governance Structure, available at 
http://quickstart.clari.net/ qs_se/webnews/wed/an/Qjapan-banking-resona.R T-y _DOU .html 
(Mar. 24, 2005). 
125. Id. 
126. Resona Bank, supra note 124. 
127. Panasonic News, Matsushita New Group Management System, available at 
http://www.matsushita.co.jp/corp/news/official.data/data.dir/en0304233/en030423-3.html 
(Mar. 24, 2005). 
128. Panasonic News, supra note 127. 
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will each serve in that capacity for one year. 129 executive officers will 
be equal, in terms of rank and status, to members of the board of 
directors. 130 
The MEI Board will focus mainly on deciding corporate 
strategies and monitoring and supervising business domain 
companies with the responsibilities for execution of business 
held by Executive Officers. MEI will not change its policy of 
having management personnel, who are well versed in day-
to-day operations, participate in Board of Directors meetings. 
To strengthen the internal auditing function, full-time Senior 
Auditors will be placed at MEI internal division companies 
and a group auditors meeting will promote collaboration with 
subsidiaries' corporate auditors. 131 
As of June 2004, the number of directors decreased from 27 to 
19. 132 Out of 19, six internal directors will have only monitoring 
responsibilities while the other 11 internal directors will have both 
monitoring and operational responsibilities. 133 There are two outside 
directors. "Through these reforms, the board of directors maintains 
balance in terms of the backgrounds of its members, while reducing the 
total number of board members. The terms of office for board members 
has also been shortened to one year to clarify their responsibilities and 
allow for a more dynamic organization"134 
TMC's governance system is meant to make the most of its 
traditional strengths. These include placing at its management core 
people capable of understanding and putting into practice TMC's 
corporate principles and of practicing hands-on decision-making 
(gene hi genbutsu-going to an issue's source to understand the actual 
situation, build consensus and expediently achieve one's goal). 135 At the 
same time the company partially adopted an U.S.-style system and 





134. Matsushita Electric, Annual Report 2004, 34, available at http://ir-
site.panasonic.com/annual/2004/html/34/index.html (Mar. 24, 2005). 
135. Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota to Introduce New Management System, 
Streamlined Board, New Managing Officers Aimed at Faster Decision-making (Mar. 28, 
2003), available at 
http://www.toyota.co.jp/jp/news/03/Mar/nt03_0310.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
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sought to strengthen corporate auditing efforts by increasing the number 
of outside statutory auditors. 136 The statutory auditors will be increased 
to seven, four of whom are from outside the company.137 
The new management system includes several notable changes. 
Non-board managing officers "will number about 30-40 persons, each 
in charge of daily operations in specific fields/divisions, and include 
non-Japanese and younger appointees, as well as executives resident at 
TMC's overseas affiliates, whose numbers will be increased. Each will 
be appointed for a one-year term."138 The new board consists of 27 
members, down from 58. All are at the senior managing director rank 
or higher. The number of non-board managing officers is 44 as of July 
1, 2004. This system is different from the typical "Company with 
Committees" system as Toyota has no outside director on the board and 
the system is heavily dependent upon the role of senior managing 
directors responsible for both oversight and operations. "Pursuant to 
home country practices exemptions granted by the New York Stock 
Exchange (the 'NYSE'), Toyota Motor Corporation ... is permitted to 
follow certain corporate governance practices complying with Japanese 
laws, regulations and stock exchange rules in lieu of NYSE' s listing 
standards."139 
E. Corporations that have not changed their corporate governance 
Despite the changes in the Commercial Code, most companies in 
Japan kept their current corporate governance structure. There is a great 
deal of opposition to the introduction of outside directors. Criticism to 
this system amounts to the question: "What do those from the outside 
know about our company?" The main concern is that such board 
members would not be capable of properly judging the company's 
business practices to make an appropriate decision. 140 Another concern 
is the availability of qualified candidates. According to a Ministry of 
Finance report, "in Japan there are not many appropriate outside 
directors and that is one of the big reasons why Japanese companies are 
reluctant to adopt outside directors."141 Table 4 depicts the reasons why 
136. Toyota Motor Corporation, supra note 135. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Toyota Motor Corporation, Annual Report 2004, 19, available at 
http://www.toyota.co.jp/en/ir/reports/annual_reports/04/ governance/2.html (last visited Mar. 
24, 2005). 
140. See Iwao Nakatani et. al., Corporate Governance Reform of Japanese Companies, 
TOYO KEIZA SHINPOSHA, Feb. 2003, at 268. 
141. Japanese Ministry of Finance Policy Research Institute, Progress in Corporate 
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Japanese firms have not adopted the "Company with Committees" 
system of governance. The first three responses indicate a general 
satisfaction with the status quo and a reluctance to change. 
TABLE 4: Reasons Why Japanese Firms Have Not Adopted A 
"Company with Committees" Governance System 
Improvement of efficiency and soundness is 
possible through current system 44.0% 
torrent statutory auditor's system functions 42.8% 
M'ell 
torrent system is well-suited to Japanese society 31.5% 
and culture 
Improvement of transparency is possible 24.1% 
through current system 
It is too difficult to have appropriate outside 13.4% 
directors 
* The data is based on the responses of a 5/8/03 survey sent to 995 companies 
by the Japanese Association of Corporate Auditors. See Report from Ministry of 
Finance Policy Research Institute, Progress in Corporate Governance Reforms 
and Revitalization of Japanese Companies (June 2003). 
One of the companies that made no changes is Canon Inc. Its 
President, Mr. Mitarai, strongly defends the current corporate 
governance structure. He argues that 
the existing corporate system under superv1s1on of its 
auditors works just fine for Canon. At many U.S. companies 
what outside directors actually do is just listen to corporate 
executives' explanations about companies, rather than 
performing their supposed role of supervising management. 
This is because they have little knowledge about day-to-day 
operations of companies due to part-time status. 142 
Governance Reforms and Revitalization of Japanese Companies, at 36. 
142. U.S.-Style Corporate Governance?, NIKKEIWEEKLY, June 30, 2003, at 9. 
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At Canon, there are 28 directors and all are internal. Mr. Mitarai 
explained that to become a director is a dream of many employees. 143 
According to a May 2003 survey of 1, 194 companies by the 
Japanese Association of Corporate Auditors, as of that date only 1.3% 
of companies actually shifted to the "Company with Committees" 
system and the number considering a change was only 1.2%.144Another 
survey, published in the weekly Toyo Keizai, found approximately 
1,500 outside directors in publicly listed companies. Of those 1,500 at 
least 1,000 are either from a firm's large shareholders, main banks, or 
from companies with which it has a material business relationship. 145 
Thus, even though they are outside directors, they are not independent. 
These surveys show that most of Japanese companies have so far made 
no change, despite the Commercial Code revision. Still, the law is 
having some effect even at those companies; some of them are 
establishing their own committees for nomination and compensation. 
Professor Nobuo Nakamura of Waseda University notes, "These new 
methods will go far in helping conventionally managed corporations 
improve the effectiveness of corporate governance."146 It may be said 
that Japanese companies are trying to establish their own competitive 
system, although the progress looks slow.· 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate governance structures in both U.S. and Japanese firms 
have changed after the Sarbanes-Oxley and Commercial Code 
legislative reforms, even though, to date, the reforms are taking place in 
only a small number of Japanese firms. The starkest difference in 
governance in each country's firms is in the composition of the boards. 
Almost all Japanese directors are from inside the firm while almost all 
U.S. directors are from outside the firm. In our view, the choice 
between inside and outside board members relates to differing views in 
each country as to the board's primary function-be it establishing 
143. See Board Ranking in 2003, supra note 113, at 41. 
144. See The Report of Research, How Companies Moved After the Revision of 
Commercial Code in 2003, JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE AUDITORS, May 8, 2003 
(According to the survey, 1.3% of 1,194 companies had actually shifted, 1.2% were 
considering a shift to the "Company with Committees" system, .83.5% companies had no 
plan to shift and 14.7% companies, which was 50.8% in the May 2002 survey, had not 
decided yet). 
145. See Do Outside Directors Function Well?, Special Report, WEEKLY TOYO KEIZAI 
(Oct. 18, 2003), at 110. 
146. See Nakamura, supra note 52, at 10. 
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management policies and strategy or monitoring the management. 
Boards always have, and always will, simultaneously serve both the 
managerial and monitoring functions. As SEC Commissioner Cynthia 
Glassman has noted, "we should recognize that there is an undeniable 
tension between the dual roles of directors as partners with management 
in running the company on the one hand, and as judges of 
management's performance on the other."147 
While the composition of the board differs dramatically in Japan 
and the United States, the size of the boards are now smaller and 
comparable, from 10-15, in each country's firms. 148 As for the critical 
issue of the independence of board members, most firms in both 
countries did not measure up. While directors in U.S. firms are usually 
outsiders, due to their close relationship with the CEO, many of those 
directors cannot be considered independent. Nevertheless, due to the 
recent NASDAQ and NYSE rules there is greater use of independent 
directors in U.S. firms than in Japanese firms. 149 Although Japanese 
critics rightly note that inside directors generally perform well the 
strategic oversight and mediating functions, at critical times the role and 
responsibility of outside independent directors becomes crucial. For 
example, Professor Bernard S. Black of Stanford Law School discusses 
the duty of special care of outside directors when a firm is a takeover 
target. 150 On the other hand, during the recent financial scandals at a 
number of U.S. firms, many "outside directors" lacked the 
independence to challenge a CEO' s financial misstatements or self-
interest actions. 151 Outside independent directors also need to be 
provided with necessary, full, timely, and accurate information while 
employees and managers need access to board members. Reporting of 
concerns to independent directors or an audit committee, as described in 
GE's guidelines, 152 is important to establish an enhanced risk 
management system. 
As Japanese firms move towards different governing systems, their 
need for board members with independent views will take different 
forms. As firms that do not move to a "Company with Committees" 
147. See Glassman, supra note 22. 
148. See Table 1 supra; see also Research by Japan Investor Relations, supra note 102. 
149. See discussion supra note 23. 
150. See Bernard S. Black, The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside Directors, ASIA Bus. 
L. REV., July 2001, at 3. 
151. See U.S.-Style Corporate Governance?, supra note 142. 
152. General Electric, Our Commitment: GE Governance Principles, available at 
http:www .ge.com/ en/spotlight/ commitment/ governance/ governance_princples.htm (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
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system continue to use the statutory auditor to monitor managers' 
decisions, the independence of most of the statutory auditors, rather 
than the independence of a majority of all board members, is critical. 
For firms that do switch to a "Company with Committees" system, thus 
giving up the outside statutory auditor and potentially losing any 
external perspective, it is important that they develop a structure which 
ensures that effective monitoring will still be performed. Although the 
law requires a majority of each committee consist of outside directors, it 
does not require outside directors to constitute a majority of the board. 
Several problems with the Commercial Code need to be addressed. 
The Code defines who are outside directors, but does not require them 
to be independent. 153 Thus, a board could consist mostly of outside 
directors who have material relationships with the firm. We 
recommend the law require firms that move to the "Company with 
Committees" system include a majority of independent directors on the 
board. Insiders alone cannot provide the independence and external 
perspective needed in many such decisions. Another problem is that the 
Code still allows an outside director to serve on more than one 
committee. Such a director could be a member of three committees and 
also have a material relationship or be a good friend of the CEO. 
Similarly, an outside statutory auditor may have a material relationship, 
such as being from a firm's main bank or from a company that has a 
significant business relationship with a firm. 154 In both cases, 
independence should be required for those positions. 
Boards also need to determine whether to separate the position 
from the chairman's position and how to set an adequate, but not 
exorbitant, level of compensation. Although there is controversy, we 
conclude that such a separation helps make clear the distinction between 
the monitoring function, which the chairman is responsible for, and the 
execution function, which the CEO performs. When the CEO is also 
chairman of the board, the board is less likely to challenge any of the 
CEO's recommendations. As to compensation, in both the U.S. and 
Japan there seems to be widespread agreement that some CEOs, 
particularly in the U.S., are paid too much. In 2001, the average CEO 
compensation in the U.S. was over 411 times the compensation for the 
average line workers in 2001. By comparison it was 43 times in 1980.155 
Kazuo lnamori, founder and Chairman emeritus of Kyocera argues, 
153. See Maeda et al., supra note 66, at 56. 
154. See id. at 271. 
155. See USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 2003, at 4. 
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Of course, a leader should be given a certain amount of 
power and compensation. However, directors, officers, 
general managers, department heads and tens of thousands of 
other employees are also working together and producing 
profit for corporation through their joint efforts. Corporate 
profit is the fruit of such joint efforts and should be shared 
with all the people. 156 
Finally, other stakeholders are becoming more important to a 
corporation and their interests also must receive attention. As noted in 
one corporation's statement about corporate objectives, corporate laws 
in the U.S. give directors and officers the flexibility to balance 
shareholders' interest against other stakeholders.157 Moreover, both in 
Japan and the United States, environmental and social responsibility are 
becoming critical issues for corporations and their customers, suppliers, 
employees and investors. The latest report on corporate governance 
reform from Japan's Ministry of Finance's Policy Research Institute 
notes that although 
it is generally considered that corporate governance reforms 
and management that places priority on employees are in an 
antagonistic relationship, this is not necessarily the case. The 
greater the extent to which employees are involved in 
management at companies under the strong monitoring 
pressure of capital markets, the more active those firms were 
toward corporate governance reforms. 158 
The Institute' s report also argues, "what was especially interesting here 
was that firms which maintained long-term employment, while 
attempting to introduce a merit-based wage system, actively pursued 
reforms and enjoyed high performance. This combination of long-term 
employment, merit based wages and active information disclosure can 
be seen as a model for rejuvenating Japanese companies."159 For both 
employees and shareholders some blending of Japanese and U.S. 
156. See USA TODAY, supra note 156. 
157. See Hewlett-Packard Company, Corporate Objectives, at 
http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/corpobj.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
158. Hideaki Miyajima, Progress in Corporate Governance Reforms and the 
Revitalization of Japanese Companies, at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0097.html 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2005). 
159. See Miyajima, supra note 158. 
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corporate governance systems appears attractive. 
An earlier article on the role of boards concluded that "the proper 
balance between the paradigms of the [b ]oard as manager versus 
monitor will differ depending on a number of company-specific 
characteristics."160 We would add that cultural differences also affect 
the balance. By utilizing their unique cultural and historic strengths, 
Japanese companies have and will continue to establish their own 
competitive corporate governance structures, as is true at both 
Matsushita and Toyota. Investors in both the U.S. and Japan are paying 
close attention to corporate governance that includes a board performing 
an effective oversight function. As the legal changes in the U.S. were 
much more encompassing than those enacted into law in Japan, it is in 
Japan where further legislation, related to the independence of board 
members, is required. Japanese firms and investors should demand that 
the government quickly implement such changes. As to changes by the 
corporations, although the method of implementation will differ, 
directors and officers in both U.S. and Japanese companies should adopt 
and implement an effective and competitive corporate governance 
system that suits their company's ability to grow and responds to the 
needs of stakeholders. 
160. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997), at 
284-86. 
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